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efforts, our government has continually proposed more and more of the same old thing. We are trying to build success on proven failure. Our medicine has not worked, so we are asked to double or triple the dose. More, more, the Administration asks. It is time for the people to rise up and say, less, less, no more, no more. For example, Robert W. Smith, executive editor of the Minneapolis Star, returned from Vietnam in June and reported that the United States wanted to assign 50 percent more advisers to Vietnamese army units. But what can more advisers achieve that earlier advisers failed to do. The problem is a lack of will to fight by the South Vietnamese, it is not a lack of advice.

Our policies have thus far failed in Vietnam, but even if they had succeeded we need to ask ourselves whether the price is not too high. Sensible and rational people should place their aims and objectives over against the cost in American lives and dollars. Is the difference between a friendly or unfriendly Vietnam worth more to the United States than 12,500 brave fighting men and as much as \$50 to \$100 billion dollars—and the pro-war advocates would raise the cost even higher. Does the kind of government Vietnam has made this much difference to the United States? Scores of countries around the world—much more powerful than tiny, poverty-ridden Vietnam—are unfriendly to the United States, but we are not spending blood and treasure to force them to maintain a government friendly to us, or to guarantee elections. It is clear that we stumbled into Vietnam inadvertently, a step at a time, and that the cost of this intervention in a civil war is much greater than we anticipated. But we have been unwilling to admit our mistake after seeing that no possible achievement in Vietnam would be worth the price we are having to pay.

The American people should insist that their government explore alternative policies in Vietnam. Many distinguished and patriotic Americans, including military experts such as General Gavin and General Shoup, have advocated for many months that we deescalate the war. As Senator Thruston Morton said on Aug. 14, we should seek "honorable disengagement." Indeed, this is the first step toward getting any kind of peace. As an initial move, the United States should immediately reduce its aggressive air and ground activity and maintain a holding action. Of course our troops should defend themselves and we should support them with everything necessary to do that. One reason we should cease our search and destroy operations is that they have been very expensive in terms of lives, and they have been a failure militarily. But the broader and more significant reason to reduce military activity is to provide a proper climate for peace negotiations.

Next, we should make it known that the U.S. is willing to negotiate a gradual withdrawal from Vietnam and leave the country to the Vietnamese. Rather than us taking the lead in negotiations, we should urge the Asian powers, the U.N., and especially U Thant, to develop policies which would be acceptable to the various interests and groups. If we let nearby Asian countries work out a solution it is much more likely to last than if we try to force some kind of settlement on the region. After all, this is an Asian problem, not an American problem, except as we have made it one.

Moreover, if it appears that the leaders who have supported us in the war are endangered, we should offer them asylum.

Most important of all, the United States should outline a policy which would gradually withdraw American troops from a land war which every knowledgeable civilian and military leader warned us against a decade ago, and get us out of Vietnam. The line is not to maintain our line of air and sea de-

fenses just off the mainland of Asia. With complete air and sea superiority in the western Pacific, no nation can successfully challenge us; and the United States will be in a position to defend its vital interests of trade or defense without getting mired down in an unending land war.

Many Americans have strong objections to concentrating our efforts on a political and diplomatic settlement in Vietnam—one in which the Vietnamese and other Asian countries would be permitted to work out the problems—because they feel we must "win" the war as a kind of atonement for those who have already died in Vietnam. This is strange reasoning. We have achieved no worthwhile goals or objectives in the national interest with the death of approximately 12,500 American troops, so the pro-war advocates urge sending more and more brave Americans boys to their deaths for equally unsound policies. Every American should, I believe, support the men in Vietnam, most of whom are there against their will, with everything they need. If this means higher taxes, or anything else, we must bear that cost. But we will serve our troops best if we help reverse the policies which have sent them there. The most loyal backing we can give our men in Vietnam is to bring them home, and our best chance of bringing them home is not in enlarging the war, but in negotiation and gradual withdrawal.

This is indeed a curious and paradoxical war. Many of the most vociferous supporters of the war have no sons in Vietnam. They keep their sons in college as long as possible and thank God when they fail to pass the physical examination for military service. They also oppose tax increases to pay for the war. In other words, the war has millions of supporters who think it is fine to keep fighting—even expand the war—so long as someone else's sons are fighting it and they can pass the cost on to the next generation. There is a basic dishonesty here which is not in the best American tradition.

Finally, the pro-war advocates have not at any time shown what benefits will accrue to the United States as a result of all the sacrifices which we have made and continue to make in Vietnam. They have not shown what the United States can get out of the war which is of value to us as a people and as a nation. How is our national interest served by elections in South Vietnam? No one has told us. How have we strengthened our defenses by losing thousands of men in a small country which could not possibly threaten or attack the United States? No one has told us. How have we helped our country by spending billions killing Vietnamese—this may provide psychic satisfaction to some people—while poverty, unrest, and riots occur here at home? No one has told us. The truth of the matter is that we have nothing to gain and everything to lose by further military involvement in Vietnam. Let us practice what we preach about self-determination and let the Vietnamese solve their own problems. Let us do what Senator Morton has proposed and seek an "honorable disengagement" by negotiation. We have tried military force and it has failed. Honest and imaginative diplomacy deserves a try.

ME file

AN AMERICAN-ARAB DIALOG

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, a visiting Lebanese professor of political science—Dr. Hassan Saab—now teaching at the University of Utah, in Salt Lake City, has written a most interesting letter recommending a new, free dialog between Americans and Arabs so that their relationship may be assessed in terms of "common ideals and interests" rather than of "power politics and domestic pressures." As he feels, presently the

I agree that such a dialog would be most valuable. I well recognize that we in America know all too little about the strong urge now being felt in the Arab world for nationhood built on freedom and justice, and I am sure that many Arabs misunderstand our efforts in Vietnam and elsewhere to help establish free and independent countries. I am sure that they all too often equate these efforts with imperialism.

But valuable as I know a wider American-Arab dialog could be, I feel also that the American attitude toward the Arab will never change deeply until there is meaningful dialog between the Arabs and the Israelis, as well. Perhaps the dialog could be a three way one—Arabs, Israelis, and Americans.

I ask that Dr. Saab's well written and eloquent letter be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

FOR AN AMERICAN-ARAB DIALOG

THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,

Salt Lake City, September 29, 1967.

MY DEAR SIR: I take pleasure in writing to you from the University of Utah, which I joined for the fall quarter of 1967 as a visiting professor of Political Science. I left Lebanon in these critical moments, hoping that my visit to the United States would allow me to communicate directly with my American friends about the present grave situation in the Middle East.

All of us, Americans and Arabs, ought to be deeply concerned with all the aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We must do our utmost to prevent the resumption of hostilities in the area. We must spare no effort in finding a peaceful and just solution to this tragic conflict. Nonetheless, its impact on American-Arab relations deserves more attention than it has received.

This great country, the United States of America, has every reason and every possibility of building in dignity, freedom, justice and peace, a creative partnership with the whole Arab world from Morocco to Iraq. The Arab world has its weaknesses and shortcomings, but it has also all the thrilling promises of a developing society. The United States has the excesses of affluence, but it has also the resourceful abilities of a developed society. American-Arab partnership should be built complementarily and patiently for the mutual good of the American and the Arab people.

There have been many obstacles which have hampered the emergence of such a partnership. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been the greatest of these obstacles. Therefore, there is a pressing need for a new constructive approach to this conflict, which would limit its catastrophic effects on American-Arab relations. A new free dialogue must immediately begin, which should enable Americans and Arabs to reassess their relations in terms of common ideals and mutual interests more than in terms of power politics or of domestic pressures. Truth, Reason, Wisdom, Statesmanship, and Farsightedness should guide this dialogue rather than prejudice, emotion, violence, politics and short-sightedness.

Americans and Arabs must not allow any "third party" to stand in the way of such a free, direct and creative dialogue. From 1947 to 1967, there has often been a "third party", such as Europe, Israel, or Communism, lying behind the deterioration of American-Arab relations. There has never been a genuine and direct confrontation between the American and the Arab people, nor an authentic meeting between the American and the Arab

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Under the impact of the Cold War, Americans see the Arabs in the shadow of a "third party": world Communism. Under the impact of three hot wars with Israel, the Arabs see the United States dominated by another "third party": world Zionism. To Americans, the Arabs are obsessed only with the destruction of Israel. To Arabs, Americans are obsessed only with the destruction of Communism. Thus, each party thinks that it knows all about what the other party stands against, but does not seem to care about what it stands for.

In the Arab mind, the prevailing image of America is the image of a stronghold for world Zionism rather than that of a new continent blessed with unlimited opportunities for human beings. In the American mind, the disturbing image of the Arab world is the image of a stronghold for world Communism rather than that of a land bursting with the restless aspirations of its people for a new renaissance. Americans equate Arab nationalism with fanaticism. They mistake Arab socialism for communism. Islam is judged through the utterances of its reactionary mullahs rather than through the bold achievements of its modernist leaders.

The Arabs equate American world leadership with imperialism. They identify American democracy with Zionist pressure groups. Americans ignore the Arabs' deep urge for a new nationhood built on concrete freedom. They do not properly appreciate the Arabs' sincere longing for a new society founded on justice. Arabs overlook American striving for a new world order governed by freedom and justice.

This basic mutual misunderstanding deepened during the tragic events of the Fifth of June, which conveyed to the Arabs the impression that Americans were feasting over their military debacle. Technological superiority and swift victory seemed to justify all the unhuman means and effects of this victory. The facts about the crisis, before, during and after the so-called "Six Days War", were reported by American mass-media of information in an utterly one-sided manner, which made every Arab question American objectivity, and led him even to wonder about the American sense of fairness.

While statesmen and diplomats are seeking at the United Nations a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, American and Arab thinkers and intellectuals must attend urgently to the more obvious task of shortening the widening gap between the American and the Arab mind. They should not allow power alone to determine the future of American-Arab relations. Man should be the master of power, not its slave.

The United States cannot rely on power alone for the preservation of her interests in the Arab world. She cannot continue to view her relations with the Arab world only as one aspect of a power game with the Soviet Union or Red China. The greatest human asset in the world contest for power in the Middle East is the good will of one hundred million Arabs, who live at the crossroad of the world continents, command the world's greatest reserves in oil, and who are the heirs to some of the world's greatest civilizations and religions. The Arab world can develop better and faster with American understanding, assistance and friendship.

American intellectuals are called upon to free themselves from the complexes of indifference, isolationism, condescendence or oneness which have determined their approach to the Arab world. Arab intellectuals should overcome the feelings of mistrust, grudging, suspicion, bitterness and resentment which have governed their approach to the United States of America.

American and Arab intellectuals must lead the way in challenging national prejudices. They ought to remind their countrymen that the people of another nationality are men, who may commit the greatest blunders but

may also pursue the greatest achievements. They ought to show them how to engage in the search for a better future rather than to indulge in recriminations about a vanishing past. Our love for Mankind, our trust in Man, and our concern with a better future for all men must be deep enough to set our minds free from all the ingrained hatreds of the past.

An association, a university, a foundation, any responsible institution should immediately take the initiative in bringing together, outside of any governmental influence, a group of American and Arab thinkers, who may be capable of starting the overdue dialogue between American and Arab thought.

I hope that this letter will stimulate the reader into more thinking about American-Arab relations, and will encourage all those who have considered any proposal for the betterment of these relations to come out with their ideas and suggestions.

My little country, Lebanon, has always believed in free and rational dialogue as the proper way for communication between men. Faithful to their role as mediators between the Western and the Arab mind, our intellectuals will be happy to make their humble but active and creative contribution to the opening of a new dialogue between American and Arab thinkers.

Sincerely yours,

DR. HASSAN SAAB,
Professor of Political Science at the
Lebanese University and the Saint
Joseph University of Beirut.

ISTHMIAN CANAL TRAFFIC

Mr. MORSE, Mr. President, a constituent of mine, Mr. Carl Svarverud, of Eugene, Oreg., has for many years been president of the Nicaraguan Strait Development Co., Nicaragua. He is an experienced engineer with many insights into the political and economic problems and relations involved in canal construction in the isthmus of Central America.

After talking to him recently in Eugene, I asked that he prepare a written account of the points that he had brought to my attention. Since the subject of Isthmian Canal traffic is of so much interest and importance to many Americans, I feel that his paper should be shared and therefore I ask unanimous consent that it appear in the Record at the conclusion of these remarks.

I should make clear that Mr. Svarverud speaks for himself; but I do agree with his general conclusion that far more attention should be given by our country to the alternatives to Panama in the construction of a new Isthmian canal.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE NICARAGUAN STRAIT DEVELOPMENT CO., INC.,
Eugene, Oreg., October 23, 1967.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: You kindly suggested to me, at our recent meeting at your Eugene home, that I prepare a written account of the points I brought to your attention and you would place it in the Congressional Record.

The Wall St. Journal reported last Friday, Oct 20, that the House Sub-Committee on Panama Canal had approved the measure, H.R. 6791, to give the Canal Study Commission an extension from June 30, 1968 to Dec. 1, 1969 to carry out its studies. The Senate companion bill, S. 1566, approved last June 6, grants an extension to Dec. 31, 1970.

The Journal further reported: "The meas-

ure is expected to face a tough fight on the House floor. The Commission's work has become embroiled in a separate dispute over three newly drafted treaties with Panama."

The aim of my enclosed article is to present a comprehensive analysis of the proposed treaties and the status of the Canal Studies.

In view of the current situation, it would appear to be a most appropriate time to place this article in the Congressional Record.

Should you consider it advisable for me to make some revisions, I will be happy to do so.

Estoy muy agradecido.

Sincerely,

CARL SVARVERUD.

PROPOSED CANAL TREATIES AND SEA LEVEL PROJECT

(By Carl Svarverud)

Speculation concerning the prospects for joint signing and ratification, in the near future, of the proposed canal treaties between the United States and Panama on the status, defense and replacement of the Panama Canal was put to rest by President Robles of Panama, October 1, 1967.

At the opening of the Panama National Assembly, President Robles "reiterated his government's stand on renegotiating the proposed treaties with the United States. Only after changes, alterations and clarifications were approved would his government decide on the best course for Panama."

Announcement had been made simultaneously in Panama and Washington, last June 26, that agreement had been reached on the three proposed treaties. Signing was tentatively set for July 24, in Washington by the two Presidents, Johnson and Robles. Ex-President Eisenhower was expected to witness the signing.

These plans were upset because quite obviously neither government anticipated the almost vicious opposition to the proposed treaties by just about every segment of Society in Panama. This included eight political parties, lawyers association, professors, 8,000 member University Student Body, Labor leaders, et. al. With a Presidential Campaign and election coming up in Panama next Spring, President Robles has prudently bowed to the overwhelming public opposition to the proposed treaties, at least in their present form.

The rude and adverse reception of the proposed treaties in Panama, which would, if ratified, grant Panama undreamed of concessions, was met with discreet silence by the Administration in Washington.

Panama's opposition to the proposed treaties demonstrates that no amount of concessions and sugar-coating will ever make palatable there a foreign enclave, or "micro-state" as Panamanians refer to the proposed treaty provision for the reduced "Canal Area." A foreign occupied military base is equally disastrous.

The fact that the proposed treaties would give Panama no less than a one thousand per cent increase in payments over the present annuity has not softened the opposition to the treaties in Panama. They would receive 17 cents a ton from canal tolls starting two years after the treaty signing. This would increase 1 cent each year for 5 years, up to 22 cents a ton. The United States would receive 8 cents a ton, increasing 1 cent a year up to 10 cents a ton. Net earnings of the canal to be split 50-50 between the United States and Panama. Panama would receive about twice as much from the canal as the United States, if the treaties were to go into effect in their original form.

Fernando Eleta, Panama Foreign Minister and in charge of treaty negotiations with the United States, in talks in Panama trying to "sell" the treaties, stated that Panama would receive approximately \$1.3 billion from the canal enterprise in the next 30 years.